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ABSTRACT Results from five studies of rea1-1ifedecision surprisinglylittle about what nonexperts do whenthey make
making are compared. In these studies, participants con ﾂ major life decisions. Hence, there is a need for studies of non ﾂ
sistently constrained the amount of information they con ﾂ experts makingimportantdecisionsto complete the pictureof
sidered to relatively few options und to a somewhatlarger rea1-worlddecisionmaking.
Five such studies are summarized here (see Table 1 for an
set of criteria. Over time, the numberof options considered
shrank, but the numberof criteria used did not. People's overview).Each study recruitedpeople facing a decisionthey
intuitive "calibration" with the predictions of normative regardedas very important.All studiesrequiredparticipantsto
linear models is surprisingly good. Although there are ef ﾂ describethe optionsunder activeconsideration andto describe
fects of education,and ability on the amount of information thecriteriausedto decide among options.Participantsratedthe

considered, different decision-making styles correlate

mostly with affective

reactions t0, and subjective descrip ﾂ
the uf/i>roachto a specific decision. Implications

holistic"goodness" of eachoption.Twoof the studies(3 and5)
used a structured-interview format; the others used survey

tions of,
for theoretical modelsof decisionmakingare discussed.

instruments. In all studies,

making, despite the number of extraneous variables that "con ﾂ
taminate'" the "pure" cognitive processes in the real world.
There is good reason to be suspicious of this assumption

assess theeffectsof decision-making styles(Galottiet a1..2006).
Thefifthstudytrackedparents of kindergarten studentsover the

participants

responded to a survey

assessing their affective reactions to the decision-making
process (e.g.. certainty,enjoyment, stress) and askingthemto
describetheir approach to the specific decisionin question.
The processes In which nonexperts make important rea1-1ife
The first studv investigated high schoolstudentschoosinga
decisions is an understudied topic. Much of what we know about
college(Galotti.1995a,1995b; Galotti& Kozherg.1996;Galotti
people'sdecisionmakingcomes eitherfromstudiesof experts & Mark, 1994).The secondstudyfollowedIst-yearcollege
(e.g., Klein, 1998) or from laboratory studies in which experiﾂ studentsas theydecided on their collegemajor (Galotti,1999).
mental participants receive a series of self-contained, hypoﾂ The third study (Galotti, 2001; Galotti, Pierce, Reimer, &
thetical decision scenarios, often gambles or games, and are
Luckner,2000) asked pregnant women abouttheir choiceof a
asked to say which ofa set ofoptionstheywould choose(Tversky birth attendant(e.g., obstetrician,family-practicephysician,
& Kahneman,1974,1981).Theassumption is thatfindingsfrom certifiednurse-midwife). The fourthstudywas a replicationof
the laboratorywill translate directly to rea1-worlddecision the second that also included individual difference measures to

(Calotti.1989.2002).Everyday decisionmaking 1ikelyincludes
processes that simply do not arise in the laboratory,
such as
searchingfor relevantinformationor clarifyinggoals.Moreover,
the existing work on expert decision makers by definition
examines people wh0,over the course of severalyears, have
produced a storedmental libraryof examples fromwhichto draw
whenthey face an instance of decisionmaking. We still know
Address correspondence to Kathleen Galotti, Department of Psy, Carleton

College, 1 North
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course of a vear as they chose their child's

first-grade placement

fromamong eightavailableoptions.
The process of decision making involves several phases
(Byrnes,1998; Galotti, 2002). All of the studies summarized
here focused on decision structuring

ﾑthe phase in which the

individualconsidersoptionsand decideson criteriato be used
in choosing among those options. The decision-structuring

phase seems key to a number of theoretical descriptions of deﾂ
cisionmaking(see Byrnes,1998,for a review),andit has been
asserted that individual differences in decision making are
especiallyL'kelvto emerge duringthis phase (Scott & Bruce,
1995).
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Overview of the Five Studies
D。。 田。 nstudi
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Population

322 (90 in

High school

d

Choosing a college

狐 ple)

cores

Choosing

a

major

MODELS
Three theoretical
studies.

The first

88

Pregnant

Interview

Education completed, pre¥ious
experience

of individuals who participated in at least one session,

survivors,

ever,

use

of these

theory (MAUT).

researchers

have argued that

rarely, if

MAUT spontaneously when making important deci-

sions, especially

if the relevant information

is extensive (Klein,

1998; Payne, 1976; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993). Other
researchers have claimed that people are quite unlikely to use

analyticalprocedures (such as thoseinvolvedwithlinearmod。

l )whenmakingfmpo

tantdeci
「

，

，

@on5(F，isnSCn&ロ。 m。 n 1994).
。

，

Image theory(Beach,1993,1998) is one alternativeto MAUT.

ItlocalCStheh
。 、 n@Ofdeci
i 。 "m 、 ki 叩 inaP
。。。 5knownaSthe
prechoice screening of options. In this phase, decision makers
winnow the number of options to a small number,sometimes one
or tw0. They do this by assessing whethereach new goa1, plan, or
alternativeis compatible with three images: the value image
(containing their values, morals, and principles), the trajectory
，

，

，

image (containing theirgoalsandaspirations),andthestrategic

image (the ways in which they plan to attain their goals). Options
judged incompatible with any image are screened out. Screening
may result in only a single option remaining active; in this case,
the decision maker's final choice is simply whether or not to
MC"pt

th 、 toPtion

・

Ifth

。 re

i"

more

screening phase, the decision maker

other decision strategics

th"n

may

。 "e
use

surVlv

。r

ofofthe

compensator}-

to make the final choice. If there

are

or
no

linear

sample includes

only

models and image

decision making.

nonexpert

those who

Other models

theory focus on

of rea1-1ife

making describe how experts with many years of experience
make decisions within their domain of expertise, often under
time pressureor other types of stress (Zsambok & Klein, 1997)
ロ。 in'sn@S(1998)

，

。

and the core

the decision maker presumably attempts to discover

options

Both traditional

In this

。 。

・

･

some

new

a

，

Decision-making style, education
completed, previous experience

Interview

MAKING

utility

Decision-making
style

Survey

sample)

decision down into independent criteria,(b) determine the relativeimportance of each
criterion,(c) list all optionsunder consideration,
and (d) rate
。、。 h "Ph 。 n 。 n 。 " 。 h 。，ぬ i。 n U"d 。 r
rtam as5umPtion
(。卍 th 、 tall 。 川 。 n arelisted andthatall
而 " 血 areindependent),
MAUT and other s0-called linear models of decision making can
be shownto be normative, meaning thatpeoplewhofollowthese
models maximize their own utility so as to best achieve their
goals (Dawes, 1982: Keeney, 1992)
However,

18

students
Parents of

models frame the present analysis

，

women

age

Ist-vear college

sample!
243 (139 in
core

mode1, decision makers (a) break

「，

None

OF DECISION

is multiattribute

dePoint
standardized test

Survry

students

the number

participated in all phases

average,

] ﾇ t-year college

core
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placement

Individual differences studied

Survey

juniors

over

Choosing a first-grade

Primary
method
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nurses, and military commanders. Klein
and his colleagues found that these experts were unlikely to
consider multiple options simultaneously. Instead, they quickly
neonatal intensive-care

categorized
or

pattern

lution

a

situation, even a novel one,
and then implemented

prototv]'ie

as

an

the appropriate

s0-

from memory. Thus, the recognition-primed decision-

making

model predicts that options will be considered

with only one under active consideration at a time
The five studies summarized here all focused on important,
rea1-1ife, nonemergency
decisionmaking by nonexperts. Diff" "tdec 日 olonswe e t"died b。 "Me 。 fthe
Mm th 、 tpeoPle
mayperform very differently when they face different kinds of
「。

，

d。。 i ， i 。 "

viding
･

･

(p"yne

etd

・，

。

1993)

preliminary

・

。

m

。

research

W Sailalm
、

。

d

atP

，。

answers to the following questions

-

How much information do people actively consider when
making important decisions?
How consistent are people in their thinking about an important

･

，

at least

，

decisionover time?

How much do people's overall views of the goodness of different options correspond to the values predicted by norma1ive linear models based on people's own criteria, importance
weightings, and perceptions of options on those criteria?
wh"tso:so「
nSofindividualdif6erences(
。卍 " in ed" 。 、 ti 。 n e， ･

Study

・

，

"ision-making

sion-making processes?

style)

influence people's deci-
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Mean Number of Options, and Criteria
Participants in Each Study
Numberof
options considered

Study

that they consider

Number of
criteria
considered

4 35
3 95
・

6 77
3 47

・

・

4 78
2 68

5 13

・

option at

one

time. hut only a

a

n"rrow@"g

・

theory.

smaller, another finding predicted

However, the number of criteria

5.90

・

than

undergraduate and graduate students who were reasoning in ﾂ
formallytended to "underexplore" issues, settlingvery quickly
on lines of reasoning that made superficial sense.
0ver time. the number of options under active consideration

grows

・

Not assessed

more

small fraction of the information potentiallyavailable.This
conclusionis reminiscent of Perkins's (1985) finding that

Considered b-)

・

I"S

in

。 meoftheRvestudies

use
，

H e
same

does

mhen"mberofC

，

it 。 ria 卜

actually rose slightly over time, perhaps as people discov ﾂ
new dimensions of their decision. Table 3 presents these
results O"eramoderatetfue
ト "m
(6 monthsto
孔 ooutay 。 " )
abouthalfthe
。 niterI"i""
"rh 、 叩 。 d;the pecihCoPti 。 " ""d
consideration were more stable. Nonetheless, there was more
change in the decision-making process than the raw numbers
indicate.
use

RESULTS

ered

AND DISCUSSION

。

・

，

，

Table 2 presents descriptive results for the information particﾂ
ipants reported considering when making their decisions. Desﾂ

pite the different samples recruited,the differentdecisions
studied, and the different

any

considering a small number of options (between two and five)
and only a slightly larger number of criteria (between 3 and 9).
In making rea1-1ife decisions, people appear to constrain the
amount of information, and especially the number of options,

thattheyactivelyconsider.Thisfindingis specificallypredicted
by image theory(Beach,1998).

Participants in these studies rarely, if
ering a single option at a time. Thus, they

reported consid ﾂ
not behaving like

ever,
were

Klein's (1998) experts. The recognition-primed decision-mak-

ing mode1, then. may pertain exclusively to expert decision
makers operating within their domain of expertise.
Thus, the answer to the question about how much information

people activelyconsiderwhenmaking importantdecisionsis
TABLE

in Information

Study

Times of

Considered

appraisals of options

were

correlated

have,given the model'sparticularway of combining ratingson

the various criteria. These predicted values were correlated with
participants' overall impressions of the options they were con-

sidering.

Predictions of three linear models were examined. The first
MAUT. This model incorporated all the information a par ﾂ
ticipant pro¥ ] ded fhe importance
weighting of a gii en criterion
was multiplied b¥ the subjective rating of each option on that
criterion, and the products for each option were summed over all
was

year

。

mme

I:

45
・

Time 1: 9.02
Time 2: 9.64

「

Time 1: winter of freshman vear

Time 1: 4.73
Time 2: 3.82

Time 2:

Time 1: 2.59
Time 2: 2.89

Time 1: 5.97
nme 2: 4・お

kindergarten year
Time2: P i"g f hild'5
kindergarten year
，

table reports

studv,

options

，

。

results

Options

considered

Time
Time
Time
Time

Time 1: fall of child's

Note. Thi?

N"mb ，。 f
criteria

Time 2: October of senior vear
Time 3: April of senior year
Time 1: winter of frei'-hman ¥par

Time 2: spring of sophomore
vear (just after declaration)

丁

and intuitive

For each model considered, I predicted a laliie for each op ﾂ
tion@@a measure
of the overall goodness that option ought to

Numberof options

Time 2: spring of sophomore
year (just before declaration)
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withthepredictions of differentlinearmodels,includingMAUT.

Over Time, by Study

assessment

Time 1: April of junior

and

，

。，

3

Consistency

"'In this

，

are
How normatively goodis people'srea1-1ifedecisionmaking?
given point, people reported To address this question, I examined the degree to which pe0-

methodologies used, the results

remarkableconsistent.At

，

2: 3.99
3: 3.50
1: 4.18
2: 2.94

considered

Criteria
considered

Times 1-2: 48
Times 2-3: 69

Times 1-2: 49
Times 2-3: 52

Time5

1― 3:

Times 1-2:

7

43

Tmes

I ― 3:

48

51

Times 1-2: 44

Times 1-2: 84

Times 1-2: 50

tyPeS

Times 1-2:

"j

72

Times 1-2: 47

。

for the core

were categorized

samples only. Study 3 is not included because there was

Ly division,

rather

than

by specific

major.

The categoric,'

used

no
were

longitudinal component
^'natural

in that

study

science

'" humanities."
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generalcognitiveability,or of experience makinga particular
decision.

Decision-making styles might also affect performance. In

4M

some

卯川
巧研

ed
Lr

%

of the studies summarized, I adopted Scott and Bruce's

(1995)taxonomy of decision-making styles,which incorporates

five styles

that

treated

are

criteria

listed. Thus. each potential option received a summary
These scores were correlated with participants' overall
impression(holistic)ratings of theoptions.Positivecorrelations
indicate better calibration with MAUT predictions.
The full MALT model makesthe questionable assumption
of weights make use of true ratio
that people's assessments
scales. Some evidence suggests that self-reported weights are

goodpredictorsof the true weightspeopleassignto criteria
(ReiUy & Doherty,1989).Therefore,T also examined predic
not

ﾂ

tions from two simpler linear models that did not make use of
subjective importance weights. One was an equaUy-weightedcntena mode1.In this case, the expected value for each option
was computed by giving all criteria equal weight (i.e., the par ﾂ

ticipant'sown importance weightswere ignored);thesubjective

ratings

of

a

given option

on

each

criterion

were

summed

calculate the expected value for that option. Expected

to

values

were

the options.

correlated with participants' holistic

ratings

of all

The second alternative to the MAUT model was the top-cri ﾂ
terion mode1. For this simple mode] (which is very similar to

distinct

stylistic

dimensions:

rational (characterizedby a thoroughsearch for and logical
evaluationof alternatives),intuitive (characterizedby a reliance
on hunches andfeelings),dependent
(characterizedby a search
for adviceand directionfromotherpeople),avoidant(rharact 。 h ， rdbyattemptsLoav

score.

as

( 。 h、 r、 。 fr ， izedbya

，

，

otd dec 田 。 "m

e"seGfimme

、 k 卜司
，

山，。 )Irandade
，
，

anrd5PonfanCous
，

i， "t 。 compIete

the processquickly@.The
or 巧 "alinstrUmentScottand
BnLe
d。 ""l 。 p。 d toaSsessd 。 。ぬon-making styleswaasfound to ha"e
g" 。 d to excelIent
p y home 田 。 p 。 p。 ，tL
ぬ samples Of
undeIg "du 、 ほ， g adu"te st"d 。 nt and milF" り 低。。 F (ぬ
2000), but had not been tested during episodes of actual deci ﾂ
sion making.
Table 5 presents results regardingindividual differences,
summarizing observed relations with measures
of cognitive
performance, self-reportedaffectivereactions to the episodeof
，

，

，

。

，

，

，，

，

。

。，

decisionmaking being examined, andparticipants'descriptions

of their approach to that specific decision. The table shows some
effects of individual differences in education and academic
ability; there were also some small effects of scores for rationa1,
intuitive, dependent, and avoidant style, especially in the case
of affective reactions and subjective descriptions of the ap ﾂ
proach to decision making. These results suggest that emotional
reactions mav mediate the role ofstvlistic individual differences
in decision making, ajthough this conclusion is speculative at
this time.

Psychological theories of decisionmaking have frequently

Gigerenzerand Goldstein's,1996,"take the best" algorithm), embraced the concept of bounded rationality, which includes
predictedvalue of an optionwas calculatedby using only the the idea that people typically use only a small subset of available

rating on the criterion to which a participant had given the highest
importance weighting. If a participant had given more than one
criterion the highest weight, then the average rating on all such
criteria was computed as the predicted value of that option.
Expected values were correlated with participants' holistic rat ﾂ

ings of all the options.

Table 4 presents the calibration coefficients for each stud).

0veral1,people's holistic assessments

of optionscorrelated

substantially with the predictions of linear models derived from
normative theories of decision making (correlations were in the
range from .53 to .90). Thus, as measured bv arguably normative
models of decision making, people's overall intuitions show a

surprisinglygooddegreeof rationality.
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the data they collected and considered. Presumably,they
adopted techniquesand shortcutsto minimize their cognitive

load. Nonetheless, as measured by traditional normative yard ﾂ
sticks of different linear models, they seemed to perform sur ﾂ
prisingly wel1. More work is needed to identify the specific
strategies people adopt as they confront decisions in new con ﾂ
texts, as well as to assess the generality of these strategies across
different types of decisions.
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information o make decisions, even important ones (Brandstatter, Gigerenzer, & Hertwig,2006;Payne et a1.,1993;Simon.
1957). Similarly, studies of expert decision makers suggest that
they restrict their focus to only some of the relevant information
(Cooksey, 1996: Zsambok & Klein, 1997). Thus. it is not sur ﾂ
prising that the nonexperts in these five studies also restricted
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